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At the start of December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, hitting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Shift in Policy

These divergent actions highlights the central feature of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—despite the fact that this aligns with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a high-ranking U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson stated this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Contradictions

This shift is major, but analysts warn it is early to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Friction

Unlike his immediate predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later confirmed using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant disagreement has developed with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Diplomacy and Conditional Intervention

A comparable tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.